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 “We refer to the immoral, disastrous and disturbing faculties 
conferred on the Co-legislative Bodies to include roads in 
abundance in the State General Plans without any other guidance 
than the political and electoral desires of the Deputies and 
Senators (…).” 
Revista de Obras Públicas (1899) 
1. Introduction 
The Spanish Restoration (1874-1923) provides political economists and 
historians with an interesting case in which to study the long-term evolution of 
clientelist systems and vote-buying mechanisms.1 The electoral system of the 
Restoration allowed two hegemonic parties (Liberals and Conservatives) to remain in 
power for almost fifty years thanks to the so-called turno pacífico (peaceful turn). This 
was a system that relied on an agreement between both “dynastic” parties according to 
which they arranged their peaceful alternation in power.2 At the same time, in these 
years, Spanish electoral tactics, which were essentially organised at the local level and 
involved the participation of local and provincial elites, were based on the systematic 
use of clientelism, coercion and mass electoral fraud so as to ensure that the electoral 
results did not contradict the objectives of the two hegemonic parties.3  
Among the various clientelist practices, one of the most frequently adopted in 
the Restoration was the exchange of votes for investment in roads, in line with the 
practice more commonly referred to today in the political economy literature as “pork-
barrel politics”. Indeed, among the many road projects approved by Parliament during 
the Restoration legislatures, a large proportion was agreed to not on economic criteria 
but rather on political grounds. These projects were known as “parliamentary roads” 
                                                        
1 In 1874 a military uprising in Spain led by general Martínez Campos brought the First 
Republic to an end and saw the reestablishment of the Bourbon dynasty. The following period 
up to Primo de Rivera’s military coup d’état in 1923 is known as the Spanish Restoration and 
was the most long lived of the Spanish constitutional regimes of the 19th century. 
2 As is customary, henceforth, we shall refer to the Liberal and Conservative parties as the 
“dynastic” parties, both of which agreed to take on a governmental role from the early years of 
Alfonso XII’s reign. The Conservative Party was founded in 1876, coinciding with the king’s 
ascension to the throne, while the Liberal Party was established four years later, in 1880, 
initially as the “Fusionist Party”, and adopting its eventual name in 1885. 
3 In Spain clientelism is usually referred to as caciquismo (and, as such, hereinafter we use both 
terms interchangeably). The concept is linked to the caciques, members of the local elite who 
gained power by manipulating the administrative machinery for their own personal benefit and 
that of their clientele. In Ramón y Cajal’s words, the cacique was an indispensable agent, “the 
only tie that links the town and the village with the State” (Moreno Luzón, 1995: 219, our 
translation). 
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 and were fiercely criticised at the time, as representative of a highly inefficient and 
corrupt system of allocation of public resources. Thus, in this paper, assuming that 
political interests shaped the allocation of road construction expenditures in Restoration 
Spain, we seek to disentangle the pork-barrel-type strategies used by the political parties 
to maximise the number of seats won in parliamentary elections. 
This paper makes two main contributions to the existing literature on the 
relationship between electoral strategies and the allocation of government spending. The 
first concerns the data used, since electoral evidence from the Spanish Restoration has 
not been used to date for this purpose.4 Secondly, and more importantly, the relevance 
of the historical changes that took place in Spain during the period under consideration, 
including the establishment of universal male suffrage in 1890 and the Spanish 
monarchy’s gradual loss of legitimacy after the so-called “Disaster” of 1898 (the loss of 
the last vestiges of the Spanish empire), heightened political competition and forced 
Spain’s politicians to modify their strategies throughout the period. As such, the 
Restoration provides an interesting case that enables us to observe empirically the 
effects of growing political competition on clientelist electoral strategies in the long 
term. 
In order to conduct our empirical analysis, we use a panel of 45 Spanish 
provinces between the years 1880 and 1914, containing information on road investment 
and electoral outcomes. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
presents a short review of some contributions in the political economy literature that 
may be relevant for the analysis of the Spanish case. Sections 3 and 4 provide, 
respectively, a description of the Spanish Restoration’s political system and some 
reflections on the role of road investment in the context of that system. Finally, Section 
5 presents the empirical analysis, which includes the data used, the estimation strategy 
and our results. Section 6 sets out the main conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
The influence of electoral strategies on the spatial allocation of public 
expenditure has been analysed in several historical and present-day case studies on 
                                                        
4  Political factors aside, the study that is most similar to ours is Herranz-Loncán’s (2007), 
which analyses the way in which the spatial distribution of Spanish transport infrastructure was 
determined by economic variables and institutional factors between 1860 and 1930. 
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 distributive politics. Two types of model can be distinguished within this literature. 
Firstly, non-partisan (or legislator-based) models emphasise the role played by 
influential legislators that are able to obtain large amounts of resources to serve the 
interests of their own district (and, in turn, those of the legislator). Such models suggest 
that congressional seniority or committee membership can have a positive impact on the 
allocation of resources, which in turn increases the probability of the re-election of the 
more influential representatives. Secondly, partisan models take into consideration that 
such legislators form part of a broader organisation (i.e. a political party) to whose 
discipline they are (to varying degrees) subject. These models place the focus more 
fully on political parties as opposed to individual legislators. In this case, two 
alternative scenarios might arise: either governments channel public funds to the more 
closely disputed political jurisdictions (that is, they target “swing” voters) or they do so 
to their “safe” seats (i.e. to their “core” voters).5 
In the case of non-partisan models, there is some (albeit not extensive) evidence of 
the role played by individual legislators in the allocation of public expenditure. Levitt 
and Poterba (1999), for instance, find a very weak association between seniority and the 
regional distribution of federal funds in the US between 1953 and 1990, although they 
observe that those states that were represented by more senior congressmen grew more 
quickly than the rest throughout the period. Milligan and Smart (2005) provide evidence 
that Canadian regional grants between 1988 and 2001 were biased towards the districts 
represented by cabinet ministers, but they also show – in contrast with many studies on 
US redistributive politics – a negative correlation between seniority and spending. The 
most plausible explanation for this relationship is, they believe, that once the seniority 
of a politician exceeds a certain threshold (for instance 10 years) her expectations of 
running for re-election will tend to fall and, therefore, they may well reduce their 
attempts to obtain spending for her particular constituency. In the case of the US during 
the 1980s, Levitt and Snyder (1995) suggest that a congressman’s efforts may have 
played an important role in accounting for the federal funds received by her district. A 
good example of the impact that an influential politician can exert on the distribution of 
public funds is provided by the case of Key Pittman, a US senator for Nevada during the 
New Deal. Pittman’s ability to obtain spending for his State is tested (and confirmed) in 
                                                        
5 Core (or partisan) voters are those that, due to their beliefs or preferences, remain loyal to a 
particular party. By contrast, swing voters are those who show no such attachment. 
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 Wallis (1998) by incorporating a leadership dummy into his model. Finally, as regards 
specific spending programs, Knight (2004) focuses on transportation projects and shows 
that US federal government legislators have incentives to increase spending in their 
districts. Such incentives, Knight argues, arise because the funding of transportation 
projects is drawn from a common pool of funds, i.e. the tax burden does not fall fully on 
the district/state/region where the expenditure is made. This preference to satisfy local 
as opposed to national interests results in the overprovision of public goods.6 
As for partisan models, some of the most frequently cited studies adopting the 
“swing voter” approach are Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan 
(1996), while Cox and McCubbins (1986) is an oft-cited example of a study taking a 
“core voter” perspective. The former assume that politicians will tend to target 
indifferent voters or those expressing weak opposition, since this group of voters are the 
only ones to represent a credible threat if not favoured. By contrast, the latter argue that, 
if candidates are risk averse and attracting swing voters has an uncertain return, 
legislators prefer to target core voters, whose preferences and needs they understand 
much better. However, to date, the empirical evidence on the “core” versus “swing” 
voter debate remains inconclusive. For instance, Wright (1974) concludes that, in order 
to maximise expected votes, federal spending during the US New Deal was used to 
target swing voters. Indeed, the US New Deal (characterised by a drastic increase in 
federal spending) has been used by many other authors to prove the existence of pork-
barrel politics. A good example of this is provided by Wallis (1998) who, using political 
productivity variables, in line with Wright (1974), reports evidence of a 
disproportionate allocation of grants to swing voters. Several other studies that provide 
evidence for the swing voter model are Johansson (2003) and Dahlberg and Johansson 
(2002) for the Swedish case, and Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005) for Spain. By contrast, 
Milligan and Smart (2005) conclude that, in the allocation of Canadian regional 
development grants between 1988 and 2001, those districts represented by members of 
the government were favoured, thereby lending support to the core voter approach; see 
also, in the same line, Levitt and Snyder (1995). 
                                                        
6 For an analysis of the implications of “universalism” see Wallis and Weingast (2005) who also 
examine infrastructure projects. Their theory of legislative choice shows why investment in 
large-scale projects during the US antebellum era was unfeasible for the federal government. 
Likewise, Inman and Fitts (1990) also discuss the costs associated with “universalism”, but 
focus their study on US fiscal policy. 
5
 Our analysis here is directly inspired by these two strands of the literature on 
distributive politics as we seek to disentangle the influence of both partisan and non-
partisan factors on the allocation of state investment in road construction during the 
Spanish Restoration. However, as we outline in the next section, the Spanish 
Restoration political system presented two specific features that must be properly 
accounted for in the analysis. Firstly, it was a clientelist system, which used public 
resources to seal a party’s political clientele in a long-term relationship of dependence. 
And, secondly, the system evolved over time towards a significantly higher degree of 
political competition, which was one of the eventual reasons for its ultimate demise. In 
this regard, recent research has focused on the operation of clientelism and machine 
politics in several autocracies or weak democracies where corruption, mass electoral 
fraud and vote-buying strategies were the most effective tactics for keeping a 
hegemonic party in power for long periods of time. This is, for instance, the case of 
Mexico where, during more than seventy years, the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI) retained power thanks to coercion and other political strategies. The reasons 
underlying the political survival of the PRI are examined in detail in Magaloni (2006) 
and Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast (2006). They conclude that the party 
rewarded its core supporters and punished the voters that betrayed them by providing 
them with less budgetary funding. Likewise, within a clientelist framework, Stokes 
(2005) builds a model, which she applies to the study of the Argentinean case, in which 
she disentangles the way that clientelist parties (referred to also as political machines) 
ensure that the voters they favour eventually honour their promises and exchange their 
votes for benefits. Although both parties and voters are likely to renege on their initial 
promises, this does not occur when the political agents are integrated within the voters’ 
social networks and are able to monitor their votes to some extent (even when the ballot 
is secret). In addition, Stokes’ model includes a repeated game that extends indefinitely 
over time which, together with the monitoring of voters, ensures that no problems of 
commitment arise. Finally, among other case studies on clientelism, Hsieh et al. (2009) 
shows how during the Chávez regime in Venezuela, his opponents – identified thanks to 
a software program called Maisanta – have been punished with lower earnings and 
fewer opportunities of employment. 
A political party’s focus on its core supporters under a clientelist system may, 
however, be affected by greater political competition, as would seem to have been the 
6
 case throughout the Spanish Restoration. Regarding this issue, Besley and Preston 
(2007) present a model in which two parties compete for voters by presenting their 
policy platforms, designed either to reward partisan voters or to attract swing voters. 
The authors use a probabilistic voting model to argue that where there is bias towards a 
political party because of the distribution of voters (i.e. electoral districting), the party 
favoured by such bias will tend to reward its core voters rather than the swing voters. 
Moreover, in Besley’s (2007) model – where, again, two parties compete for swing 
voters – the broader the electoral margin that a party faces, the higher is the spending 
addressed directly to its supporters at the expense of the swing voters and, at the same 
time, the higher the utility (in terms of political rents) that a party obtains from winning, 
the more likely it is to direct spending towards the swing voters. Similarly, Milligan and 
Smart (2005) establish that the impact of the voting margin in a particular district 
depends on whether it is a government or opposition seat. Districts held by the 
opposition are able to ensure higher government expenditure when the electoral margin 
is low, whereas this pattern does not hold if the district is government held. In other 
words, changes in the level of political competition have a clear impact on policy 
choices. In this context, after describing the characteristics of the Spanish political 
system at the time, in section 5 we present an empirical analysis that seeks to 
disentangle the extent to which these different strategies were present in the political 
system of the Spanish Restoration and the extent to which they altered over time as 
political competition increased. 
 
3. The Spanish political system during the Restoration  
The Spanish Restoration system presented a number of particular political and 
electoral features that require a brief explanation if we are to understand fully the 
political economy of road construction during the period.7 Apart from two earlier brief 
periods of parliamentary rule in the years 1812-1813 and 1820-1823, Spanish 
Parliamentary elections were called quite regularly between 1834 and 1923, until ended 
                                                        
7 The political mechanisms of the Restoration bear a certain resemblance to those of the Italian 
trasformismo and the Portuguese rotativismo. Moreover, Restoration Spain may also be 
compared to other earlier European political systems such as ‘Old Corruption’ in England and 
Napoleon III’s France (Moreno-Luzón, 2007). For an international comparison of clientelism, 
see Piattoni (2001). 
7
 by Primo de Rivera’s military dictatorship, which lasted until 1931. For most of this 
period, Spanish elections operated in accordance with the system established by the 
1846 electoral law, which divided the country into uninominal districts, of (initially) ca. 
50,000 inhabitants, in which the wealthier and more educated men elected their deputy, 
according to census suffrage and a simple majority voting rule.8 
The suffrage underwent substantial changes over time, through a gradual 
extension of the electorate and, finally, the establishment of universal male suffrage in 
1890.9 As for the district structure, it failed to adapt to the marked demographic changes 
that were recorded after 1846, giving rise therefore to significant size differences 
between districts. The main change to which it was exposed was the establishment of 
several “plurinominal” districts, which were mainly located in urban constituencies. In 
these districts, citizens voted for one or two candidates fewer than the total amount to be 
elected, in order to ensure that minorities were represented. The creation of those 
“plurinominal” districts was in general characterised by the presence of 
gerrymandering, in order to neutralise, as far as it was possible, the relatively more 
independent urban electorate.  
Under this system, the elections that were held in the period 1846-1868 were 
characterised by systematic fraud and the absence of competition, since the political 
party that enjoyed control of the government always won them. Thus, the only way to 
change the political composition of the parliament was through military uprisings, as 
exemplified by the events of 1854 and 1868. By contrast, during the Restoration period, 
the Liberal and Conservative parties agreed to alternate in power (the turno pacífico 
system), forming a strong duopoly that survived until 1923. The system operated as 
follows. Before the election, the King appointed a new Prime Minister (Presidente del 
Consejo) from the dynastic party that was in minority in the Parliament. Then, with a 
new government in office, the King dissolved the Parliament and called for elections. 
                                                        
8 Although the Spanish Parliament (Cortes) had a bicameral structure throughout the 
Restoration period, our analysis is restricted to the lower chamber (Congreso de los Diputados) 
since the members of the upper chamber (Senado) either held their position in their own right or 
were appointed by the king or an electoral college comprising the provincial administrations 
(Diputaciones) and a number of electors designated by the local councils and the wealthiest 
taxpayers. 
9 Universal male suffrage was also temporarily introduced during the revolutionary period of 
1868-1876. For a more detailed description of the electoral system during the Restoration 
period, see Linz et al. (2005), Varela Ortega et al. (1996) and Varela Ortega (2001), among 
others. 
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 These were then rigged by the new Ministry of Gobernación (Home Office), whose aim 
was to ensure that the new party in power could obtain a majority of seats in the new 
Parliament. In this context, in order to ensure that the election outcome was the one 
planned by the government (the so-called “encasillado”), it was more convenient for the 
party in power to collude with the main opposition party, rather than engaging in 
competitive mobilisation. However, the arrangement between the two “dynastic” parties 
was not just the simple assignment of a fixed number of seats, but rather the outcome of 
complex negotiations. 
Given the government’s limited capacity to intervene in and regulate society, 
however, the expected electoral result could only be achieved by relying on the support 
of the local elites (caciques). This meant forging links between candidates and the local 
and provincial powers, who could wield a direct influence over the electoral outcomes 
by controlling the polling stations and via the widespread use of vote buying, coercion 
and mass fraud,10 as well as by promising individual favours or indivisible benefits to 
the electorate, which were to be obtained thanks to the influence of the elected 
candidate. 
An interesting distinction was made between the candidates, classified as either 
“propios”11 or “cuneros”.  The former were candidates that repeatedly ran for election 
in the same districts and who had some link or tie with them - in some instances they 
were the local caciques. The latter, by contrast, were designated directly by their party 
to a certain district, in accordance with the “encasillado”. Varela Ortega (1977: 414) 
defines them as those “whose election was due to the government’s support rather than 
their local influence”, and the districts in which these deputies stood were known as 
“available districts”. Most cuneros, therefore, were not local citizens (and had no ties 
with the district they had been assigned), and frequently public campaigns were 
                                                        
10 Situations of electoral fraud and coercion were generically known as pucherazos. There are 
numerous descriptions of such fraudulent practices in the literature of the period. By way of 
example, several detailed descriptions of the irregularities observed in the 1886 elections can be 
found in Dardé (1986): “(…) two inspectors complained because nobody published with 
sufficient clarity the place where the election was to be held and because the ballot box had no 
lock”, “the ballots were kept in the drawer of a table, instead of in a ballot box”, etc. That year 
in Barcelona, Valentí Almirall (a Republican politician) declared that he saw his late father 
going to vote several times, transformed into a municipal employee or a police informer (Rubí 
Casals and Armengol Segú, 2001: 269). 
11 Also known as “natural candidates, with roots or standing in their own right” (Varela Ortega, 
1977: 414). 
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 mounted against them. As Moreno Luzón (1995) points out, at that time it was believed 
that deputies without any links with a particular district would not perform adequately 
their main function, which was precisely seeking to obtain favours for their voters in 
Madrid. 
In other words, the caciques (who, in practice, might also be candidates), 
established close links with both the government and the voters, in what might be 
described as “patron-client” relationships. In this context, what the local “clients” 
demanded from the elected deputies was essentially access to administrative resources. 
As such, the operation of the clientelist system was largely based on the discriminatory 
application of bureaucracy and on the deputies’ capacity to expedite certain 
administrative processes (Moreno Luzón, 1995; Comín, 1988). 
The specific promises and favours that might win local electoral support were 
particularly diverse. The most frequent were perhaps individual benefits, including 
exemption from military service, personal interventions in the judicial system, job 
offers, etc. But, as discussed above, indivisible favours such as dams, roads, railways or 
civil buildings (schools, markets, etc.) were also very important. Moreover, these 
individual and collective benefits not only affected public expenditure; they also had a 
bearing on the distribution of the tax burden among individuals and districts. Therefore, 
one of the main consequences of clientelism was the arbitrary application of the tax 
system and the distribution of public funds (Comín, 1988: 505-7).12 In Varela Ortega’s 
(2001: 12) words, the Parliament became the solution for the caciques’ “hungering for 
budget”. 
In this context, the political system of the Spanish Restoration, as just described, 
was gradually undermined, and it became increasingly difficult for the government to 
control the electoral process. These problems became apparent in the 1890s and 
culminated in the complete breakdown of the system in the years immediately 
preceding the 1923 coup d’état. In fact, since 1918 it had proved extremely difficult for 
the government to obtain a Parliamentary majority. The reasons for this crisis were 
manifold. On the one hand, the system had proved incapable of adapting to the 
country’s process of economic and social modernisation. Since the early years of the 
                                                        
12 For more details regarding the pressure exerted by the districts on Parliament as regards tax 
policy, see Martorell Linares (2000: 276-81). 
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 twentieth century, this process gave rise to the growing presence of minority parties that 
sought to mobilise the electorate by appealing to ideological arguments in the context of 
increasingly competitive elections. As such, these parties gained considerable influence 
in a number of Spanish towns (Moreno Luzón, 2007; Comín, 1988).13 On the other 
hand, the influence of the local powers had gradually increased at the expense of that of 
the central government. This process was further encouraged by the establishment of 
universal male suffrage in 1890, by the Spanish monarchy’s gradual loss of legitimacy 
after the 1898 defeat in the colonial war, and by the growing fragmentation of the 
“dynastic” parties since the early years of the twentieth century. Such fragmentation 
“obliged Spanish politicians to look for security in a guaranteed local power base in 
order not to be swept away by the instability of the government” (Moreno Luzón, 2007: 
435; see also Martorell Linares, 2000: 277).14 
Those processes were reflected, on the one hand, by an increase in the presence 
of minority parties in the Parliament and, on the other, by the growth in the number of 
districts “owned” by the same deputy election after election (“propios”), regardless of 
which party was in power and, therefore, by the increasing presence in Congress of 
members of the “dynastic” opposition party. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these effects by 
reporting the percentage of deputies running for the Liberal, Conservative and minority 
parties at each election. As we can see, not only did the margin between the two 
“dynastic” parties contract, but also the margin between these parties and the minority 
ones became smaller. This process fluctuated, however, in pace. An acceleration was 
noted after the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1891, but this was abruptly 
interrupted by the 1896 election, only to be resumed thereafter. The 1896 downward 
trend might reflect successive government attempts, founded on widespread fraud 
practices, to counter the difficulties that the “dynastic” parties were experiencing in 
                                                        
13 The main minority groups in this period were the republican parties, followed by various 
groups of regionalists, traditionalists and also (by the end of the period) socialists. According to 
Moreno Luzón (2007: 430-1), those parties’ “modern methods did not prevent the frequent 
recurrence of cacique-inspired techniques, from fraud to administrative favours, whenever a 
political party dominated a particular branch of power. Mixed political apparatuses, such as 
the reformist republicans in Asturias or the regionalists in Catalonia, who combined modern 
political activities in the cities with the promotion of caciquismo in rural areas, were quite 
common.” 
14 However, Varela Ortega (2001) and Comín (1988) conclude that universal male suffrage did 
not introduce significant changes in the operation of the system, except for the greater incidence 
of vote-buying mechanisms (which made elections more expensive for candidates and the 
State). 
11
 keeping the system under their control following the introduction of universal male 
suffrage. However, their efforts had only a transient effect, and the vote of the minority 
parties rose again in the 1898 election and thereafter. 
 
*** Figures 1 and 2 about here*** 
 
4. Road construction in Restoration Spain 
During the Restoration, the construction of roads became one of the most 
frequent of the collective and indivisible benefits to be exchanged for votes. It is easy to 
understand why, given the importance of roads to Spain’s transport system at that time. 
Although railways were indeed the core element of the transport system during the 
second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century (before the diffusion of the 
motorcar), for a large area of the Spanish territory roads provided the only link to the 
railway network and to the most important urban and international markets. Since low 
population density had prevented the expansion of the railway network beyond a certain 
threshold,15 and the geographic characteristics of the country hampered the use of 
navigation for internal transport, roads afforded the only possibility of communication 
for large swathes of the territory.  
Road construction (and infrastructure investment in general) took off in Spain 
after the end of the Carlist War in 1840, and accelerated after 1855. Between 1802 and 
1855, 116 km of new roads were constructed yearly in Spain, and this figure rose to 422 
km between 1855 and 1877 and to 791 km between 1877 and 1911. 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Spanish roads were divided 
into three categories. Those in the first category formed a radial network centred on 
Madrid, second category roads connected the main population centres with each other 
and with the railways, and third category roads served the rest of the territory. In the 
first few decades after 1840, the construction of first category roads attracted the 
greatest amount of resources. However, as Figure 3 shows, later on an increasing share 
of resources was dedicated to roads in the second and, especially, third categories, 
which were supposed to meet regional and local interests. 
                                                        
15 By 1900, the density of the Spanish railway network was 26 km per 1000 km2 of territory, 
compared with 130 in Great Britain, 81 in France and 55 in Italy, and some Spanish towns were 
more than 200 km away from the nearest railway station (Herranz-Loncan, 2008: 48). 
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 ***Figure 3 about here*** 
The construction of roads in this third category caused the greatest controversy 
at the time, because spending on them appeared to be largely allocated according to 
political criteria. There are many recorded instances of criticism from the mid- 
nineteenth century onwards directed against the way in which territorial interests 
influenced Parliamentary decisions regarding road investment. To a large extent, this 
situation was the consequence of the fact that, for most of the period under review, 
attempts to develop a systematic road plan met with repeated failure. In fact, the 1857 
Road Law had specified that “the quantities allocated to the three types of road ought to 
be equitably distributed amongst the Kingdom’s provinces” instead of using resources 
for “culminating work of limited use and the futile usage of jobs and resources” (García 
Ortega, 1982) and, as an outcome of this Law, two road plans were approved in 1860 
and 1864. Nevertheless, those plans proved totally ineffective, constituting merely a 
catalogue of the work in progress in those years. Later, in 1877, a new Road Plan was 
introduced which favoured, with its ambiguity, the further inclusion in it of a large 
number of additional roads. This situation was only amended by the 1911 Road Law, 
which repealed the 1877 Road Plan. Finally, in 1914 a new road plan (the Ugarte Plan) 
was approved that required road works to be classified as either urgent or necessary, a 
classification that had to be updated every two years. 
Given the absence of a well-defined road plan, the few decades leading up to 
1911 were characterised by a legislative delirium in the field. More than 1,000 new road 
projects were passed by Parliament between 1877 and 1911, representing more than 
40,000 km (i.e. more than the total mileage constructed by the State in the whole of the 
nineteenth century). This process reached its zenith in the 1890s: in the Parliamentary 
year of 1895-1896 alone, 313 new road projects were passed. Clearly, many of these 
projects, known at the time as “parliamentary roads”, would not in fact be built during 
the period. However, this uncontrolled expansion of road projects gave considerable 
freedom to successive governments to undertake the allocation of road investment 
funds. According to various contemporary opinions, this enabled the executive to 
allocate expenditure on the basis of electoral considerations and private interests, rather 
than of the satisfaction of real territorial needs. As a consequence, as the government 
itself stated by 1886: “There may be cases of two, three and sometimes four roads all 
abundantly servicing the same public interests, and others that run through desert 
13
 areas, and at such a high cost that it should have been enough to defer its construction 
through more fertile and populated terrains” (Government Royal Decree 17 September 
1886).16 
In this regard, roads seem to have constituted an ever-present element in the 
electoral process, as one of the collective benefits (along with other forms of 
infrastructure and certain tax benefits) offered by candidates to districts in exchange for 
their electoral support. The candidates might typically promise the passing of a given 
road project before Parliament but, more importantly, they might promise to secure the 
necessary public funding for the construction of the road. Thus, both legislative and 
administrative promises were present in the electoral campaigns. For instance, in 1904, 
César de la Mora asked Prime Minister Maura to approve the construction of a number 
of roads in Puente del Arzobispo because “if I do not get any positive results in my 
district I am done for”, and Luis Gallo was elected in Talavera in 1899 and 1901 after 
promising improvements to the district’s roads (Moreno Luzón, 2001, 169-170). Frías 
Corredor’s (1992, 253) study on the province of Huesca provides detailed information 
on the road projects that were both approved and eventually built in the province during 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century thanks to the influence of the elected deputies, 
and indicates that “Broadly speaking, there was not a single “fixed” deputy that could 
not be related by the electorate with the construction of certain important roads that 
reflected the district’s interests”. In fact, according to Comín (1988: 675), the growth in 
the budget of the Ministry of Public Works during the Restoration can be explained in 
part by the electoral costs of the parliamentary roads. 
Therefore, up until 1911 at least, the regional distribution of state investment in 
roads seems to have been largely determined by the influence of territorial interests, as 
represented by each district’s parliamentary deputy. This was particularly the case since 
1870, when second- and third-category road investment became dominant in the 
aggregate expenditure on road construction (by contrast, before 1870 the main priority 
had been to build the basic radial network, which had reduced the room for manoeuvre 
of regional and local interests). As such, an analysis of the regional allocation of road 
construction expenditure might constitute an effective approach for understanding the 
electoral strategies of successive Spanish governments during the Restoration period. In 
                                                        
16 For a more detailed discussion on “parliamentary roads” see, for instance, Cuéllar Villar 
(2003) or Alzola y Minondo (1899). 
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 addition, it has the advantage over other indivisible benefits (that were also extensively 
used at the time) of being supported by an abundance of systematic quantitative 
information, since road investment statistics were published regularly throughout the 
period in the Memorias, Anuarios and Estadísticas de Obras Públicas. In the next 
section we seek to analyse this question. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
In this section we analyse the relationship between electoral outcomes and the 
spatial allocation of road expenditure during the Spanish Restoration. As has been 
described, late nineteenth and early twentieth century Spain provides an interesting case 
of a two-party clientelist system that was threatened by the gradual increase in electoral 
competition. This was reflected in the growing difficulties that successive governments 
found in controlling the Congress, due to the increasing presence of deputies from both 
the opposition “dynastic” party and the minority parties. Here, therefore, we analyse 
whether the provinces that resisted the government’s plan were punished with the 
withdrawal of budgetary funds, and also whether government strategy changed over 
time, as the level of competition increased, with the gradual reallocation of road 
construction expenditure towards swing voters (i.e. those more likely to support 
candidates from the opposition “dynastic” party or the minority parties). In addition, 
since most empirical analyses in the pork-barrel literature predict that more senior 
deputies should be more able to extract larger amounts of roads for their regions, we 
seek to determine whether a deputy’s seniority and/or leadership translated into a higher 
level of funding in his constituency.  
5.1. Data and variables 
Sample. The analysis below is carried out at the provincial level. As indicated, 
during the period under analysis, the Spanish general elections were held at the district 
level. However, as information on road investment is only available at the provincial 
level, we have had to aggregate the data on electoral outcomes by province.17 Note, 
also, that as road investment in the Basque Country and Navarre was mostly financed 
                                                        
17 Varela Ortega (2001: 562) notes, however, that a significant number of provinces showed 
certain political unity during the period under study. 
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 and executed by the provincial administrations (Diputaciones), we have excluded these 
provinces (Álava, Biscay, Guipúzcoa and Navarre) from the analysis. Hence, our final 
sample consists of a set of 45 provinces with an average of 309 districts and 372 elected 
deputies per election. 
We have restricted our analysis to those road investment projects undertaken by 
the central government between 1880 and 1914. We have selected this period because 
1880 is the first year following the 1879 election, which may be considered as the 
starting point of the turno pacífico system, while 1914 is the year of the approval of the 
Ugarte Plan, which reduced government flexibility in its decisions regarding road 
construction. We assume that a given year’s investment was influenced by the nearest 
previous election but, at the same time, we consider that the expenditure made by the 
government in an electoral year was not influenced by that year’s election outcomes. 
This is reasonable given that infrastructure projects needed to go through a somewhat 
involved process before being approved and implemented. In other words, politicians 
needed some time to exert their influence on investment. Based on this assumption, the 
elections that are included in the analysis are the following: 1879, 1881, 1884, 1886, 
1891, 1893, 1896, 1898, 1899, 1901, 1903, 1905, 1907 and 1910.   
Dependent variable. Although, ideally, we should have focused on public 
expenditure dedicated to second and third category roads, the data on road investment 
are not disaggregated by category for some years of the period under study. However, 
since second and third category roads accounted for 93% of the new road mileage 
constructed during the period, we consider that the aggregate investment on all 
categories of State roads can be used as a good approximation to our variable of 
interest. Road investment is measured in constant pesetas per capita, and we only 
consider new road construction while disregarding any other type of expenditure, such 
as maintenance work.18 Information on public road investment has been extracted from 
the Memorias, Anuarios and Estadísticas de Obras Públicas, which were published 
regularly by the Spanish Ministry of Public Works (Ministerio de Fomento) between 
1856 and 1924. 
                                                        
18 Investment figures have been expressed in real terms by using the price index for “other 
construction” investment by Prados de la Escosura (2003). 
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 Independent variables. We have used two sets of independent variables for our 
empirical analysis, which are related, respectively, with potential political and economic 
explanatory factors for the allocation of road investment. The political variables have 
been constructed on the basis of electoral data. The main source of information is the 
appendix to Varela Ortega (2001), which contains the name of the deputies elected in 
each district from 1876 until 1923 as well as their party of affiliation. This database, 
however, has several gaps which have been filled by drawing on Sánchez de los Santos 
(1908 and 1910), the yearly publication El año politico (1895-1910), some of the 
newspapers published in the days after each election (El Imparcial, El Liberal, La 
Correspondencia de España, La Época and ABC) and the Historical Archive of 
Deputies (1810-1977) of the Spanish Congress.19 
We have divided the deputies elected into government deputies (those who 
belonged to the party in government), opposition deputies (Liberal deputies under a 
Conservative government and Conservative deputies under a Liberal government), and 
minority deputies (those not running as either Liberals or Conservatives). This 
distinction is made to test whether the government was investing more heavily in those 
regions with a higher share of government deputies or, on the contrary, whether the 
party in government made a strategic use of road investment to buy votes in those 
regions in which the minority parties were more influential. Moreover, we add a 
variable that accounts for the change in the number of minority deputies elected with 
respect to the previous election, in order to test if the government reacted in the short 
term to increases in the level of political competition. Besides these four variables (% 
Government Seats, % Opposition Seats, % Minority Seats and % Change in Minority 
Seats), it would have been useful to include a “political productivity index” as in Wallis 
(1998) or Wright (1974). However, data on the share of the vote obtained by each 
candidate are scarce and unreliable, because of extensive electoral fraud. 
Additionally, in line with the pork-barrel literature, we have estimated a variable 
that accounts for the deputies’ seniority in the Parliament, on the basis of the hypothesis 
that more senior representatives may be able to extract larger amounts of resources for 
their districts. We have used two alternative measures. With the first of these, which we 
                                                        
19 This information can be found at the website of the Spanish Congress: 
http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/SDocum/ArchCon/SDHistoDipu 
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 call Relative Seniority, we aim to measure the seniority of a deputy by comparing him 
with the most senior deputy standing at that election. In other words, the Relative 
Seniority of a province at an election is equal to the average of the seniority of each of 
its deputies with respect to the maximum seniority observed at this election (in 
whichever province). The higher this indicator is, the smaller is the gap between the 
province’s deputies and the most senior representative and, therefore, the more capacity 
they have to attract resources. The second measure (% Senior Deputies) is an alternative 
and simpler seniority indicator, which corresponds to the share of elected deputies that 
had already been elected in previous elections in each province. These two seniority 
indicators are obtained by tracing the names of each elected deputy in the databases for 
the previous elections.20 
The pork-barrel literature also suggests that certain political leaders can wield 
greater influence and so obtain more public resources for their regions. Thus, we have 
created two leadership variables to capture this effect: Public Works Minister (dummy 
variable set to 1 if the minister of Public Works was a deputy elected for that province) 
and % Deputies who were Ministers in the Past (share of deputies in province i who are 
not ministers in term t but who have been so in previous terms). Note that this last 
variable not only captures the leadership effect but also the seniority effect. In line with 
suggestions in the pork-barrel literature, we expect the sign of these two variables to be 
positive. 
As far as economic factors that might influence the allocation of road investment 
are concerned, we incorporate three variables following the analysis conducted in 
Herranz-Loncán (2007): urbanisation and industrialisation rates and GDP per capita. 
We have filled the time gaps in these variables through interpolation. Table 1 presents a 
summary description of the variables and their descriptive statistics and data sources. 
***Table 1 about here*** 
 
 
4.2. Estimation strategy and results 
Econometric specification. In order to analyse how political factors conditioned 
the distribution of road investment in Spain between 1880 and 1914, we use a panel 
                                                        
20 The first election considered when measuring the deputies’ seniority is the general election of 
1876, the first to be held in the Restoration period. 
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 dataset comprising 35 years and 45 provinces, in which we consider public road 
investment as being influenced both by economic factors and by electoral variables. 
Provided that we can observe the behaviour of individual units (provinces) at different 
points in time, we can capture variation between units as well as over time by using a 
linear panel data model. Thus, the initial specification of our model is as follows: 
ittititititit DXSeniorityLeadershipnCompetitioPoli εδλψμβ +++++= .
 
itiit u+= αε  
 
(1) 
where iit is investment per capita on roads; Xit accounts for economic variables that 
change over time (GDP p.c., Urban Population and Industrial Sector); 
“Pol.Competitionit” includes the political variables which aim at measuring the degree 
of political competition at each election (% Opposition Seats, % Minority Seats and % 
Change in Minority Seats); “Leadershipit” comprises the two variables which account 
for influential politicians (Public Works Ministers and % Deputies who were Ministers 
in the past); “Seniorityit” is alternatively measured through the two aforementioned 
variables (Relative Seniority and % Senior Deputies); Dt is a time dummy to identify 
each year (so we have t-1 binary variables) and captures the impact of certain factors 
(such as economic crises, national policies, etc.) that occurred in a given year and which 
affected all the provinces; αi represents the time-invariant, province-specific effects; and 
uit is an error term which is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Note that the 
political variables are held constant within each term, as they only vary with every 
election. 
Equation (1) above provides the basic framework from which we can derive two 
different econometric specifications, namely the random and the fixed effects models. 
The latter will be preferred to the former (which provides biased estimates) if the 
province-specific effects αi are correlated with the explanatory variables. By contrast, if 
they are uncorrelated, random-effect estimates are consistent and efficient. In order to 
choose among both specifications, a Hausman test must be carried out which contrasts 
the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the regressors. 
However, in this case, the standard Hausman test is not appropriate since, according to 
different tests, the disturbances in our panel are both heteroscedastic and autocorrelated, 
and this makes clustering our panel convenient. Clustering arises when errors for 
different observations within a group/cluster are correlated. In our study, the panel is 
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 clustered by election and province, i.e. each province at each election year forms a 
cluster. Thus, we created 630 clusters. This means that the road construction undertaken 
within a province during the term of office (disregarding investments in electoral years, 
as explained) correlates with each other but not with other clusters. In this context, in 
order to report robust SE estimates we need to conduct cluster-robust inference. Instead, 
therefore, of a standard Hausman test we perform a robust Hausman test based on a 
Wald test, as suggested in Wooldrige (2002).  The results of this test confirm that the 
best option is to use a random-effects model. At the same time, when testing for 
random-effects we use the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier to test whether variances 
across entities are zero, and we reject this hypothesis, which again confirms the validity 
of the model chosen. 
Results. The regressions whose outcomes we present in Table 2 are based on 
equation (1). 
***Table 2 about here*** 
Columns (1) to (4) present the random-effects estimates obtained when only 
political variables are taken into account. These variables are divided into two groups: 
“Political Competition” and “Leadership and Seniority” variables. In the first group, 
only the % Minority Seats – i.e. the share of deputies in province i that represent a 
Minority (i.e. non dynastic) party –  has a statistically significant and positive effect on 
the amount of road investment received by a province.  By contrast, we do not find any 
significant impact of the % Change in Minority Seats (the percentage difference 
between the share of Minority deputies obtained in election t with respect to the 
previous election). The % Opposition Seats (proportion of deputies who belonged to the 
dynastic party which was not in power at that time) also has a non significant effect on 
the dependent variable, meaning that the dynastic parties did not favour one another 
when in government. As for the second group of political variables, having a Minister 
of Public Works as the representative of a province does not have a significant impact 
on the allocation of roads towards such regions and neither does the fact of having 
relatively more senior deputies (using whichever of the two seniority measures 
computed). 
The result that the seniority of deputies per se has no impact on the allocation of 
road investment is a surprising outcome. For instance, Frías Corredor (1992: 249) 
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 indicates that, in the case of the province of Huesca, it “is no accident that the longest 
representations coincide with those deputies that achieved specific results for their 
electorate”. A possible explanation for our results, in line with suggestions made in 
Milligan and Smart (2005), is that once the seniority of a politician exceeds a certain 
threshold their expectations of running for re-election might fall and, as such, they 
might relax their efforts in attempting to obtain spending for their district. On the other 
hand, the significant and positive sign of the % Deputies who were Ministers in the past 
reflects, in contrast, the fact that being represented by senior deputies who had 
previously been ministers (and, therefore, more influential than the others) did have a 
significant and positive impact on the amount of public expenditure on roads. Once the 
economic control variables (per capita income, urbanisation and industrialisation rates) 
are included in the regression – see column (5) of Table 2 – these same results hold, 
although the variables that are relevant are only statistically significant at the 10% level. 
In short, according to the results reported in Table 2, apparently the government made 
relatively larger investments in provinces with a large share of minority deputies – 
presumably with the objective of influencing its citizens and buying their votes. At the 
same time, regions represented by the most influential politicians (i.e. deputies who had 
been ministers in previous administrations) were also the recipients of larger road 
investments. 
Structural change. As described in section 3, the political system of the Spanish 
Restoration underwent a gradual transformation throughout the period under 
consideration and, therefore, the results in Table 2 that account for the impact of the 
‘political competition’ variables might, to some extent, be misleading if they were 
driven by the presence of structural change. In order to account for this possibility, we 
have run a new estimation that distinguishes between two different subperiods. We took 
1890 as the break-off point, i.e. the year in which universal male suffrage was 
introduced and which, according to Moreno Luzón (2007) and Martorell Linares (2000), 
among others, saw a strengthening in the relationship between candidates and districts 
and resulted in a loss of the central government’s prominence in the electoral process.21 
In addition, the 1890s are, in general, considered by historians as being the years that 
saw the onset of the crisis in the system, due not only to the extension of suffrage but 
                                                        
21 By contrast, Varela Ortega (2001) and Comín (1988) minimise the role of the establishment 
of universal male suffrage in the transformation of the political system (see above). 
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 also to the modernisation of the country, the monarchy’s gradual loss of legitimacy after 
the 1898 defeat, and the growing fragmentation of the “dynastic” parties (Comín, 
1988).22 Therefore, the first subperiod that we consider includes the elections from 1879 
until 1886, and the second one the elections from 1891 until 1910. 
We have defined a time dummy variable for the second subperiod,23 which has 
been interacted with each of the ‘political competition’ variables, generating three new 
variables: % Minority Seats × 2nd Subperiod, % Opposition Seats × 2nd Subperiod and 
% Change in Minority Seats × 2nd Subperiod. The results of estimating regression (1) 
with these new variables are presented in Table 3 below. Column (5), which shows the 
estimation outcomes of the more complete version of the regression, confirms once 
more that the share of minority deputies had a significant impact on government 
expenditure on road construction. However, while the sign of this effect was negative 
during the first subperiod, this trend was reversed after 1890. The same process may be 
observed in the case of the opposition variable, although the coefficient is lower in this 
case. As for the impact of the change in minority seats with respect to the previous 
election, this again is non significant, as is the impact of the seniority variables. Finally, 
the deputies who had been ministers in previous administrations seem to have used their 
influence to attract greater resources to their provinces. 
Based on earlier considerations, these results seem to suggest that the low level 
of electoral competition during the early years of the Spanish Restoration made the use 
of vote-buying tactics unnecessary and, therefore, the government could assign more 
resources to the “core” regions24 at the expense of the rest of the country. This would 
indicate that the dynastic parties did not collude to favour one another when allocating 
public funds for roads, as might initially be expected. By contrast, after 1890, the results 
of the estimation suggest two possible interpretations, both associated with increasing 
political competition. On the one hand, it might be argued that the rise in the number of 
minority and opposition deputies forced the government to exchange road investments, 
                                                        
22 Comín (1988: 495) suggests 1898 as the main turning point in the Restoration period. 
Actually, the results of the analysis are not altered significantly if we take this year instead of 
1890. 
23 Since the regression has a constant term, we only interact a dummy variable for the second period, 
while taking the first subperiod as a reference. The dummy for the second subperiod is equal to 1 if the 
political variables refer to an election held after 1890. 
24 By ‘core regions’ we refer to those provinces in which the party in government enjoyed the largest 
representation. 
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 as well as other benefits, for electoral votes, in an attempt to attract swing voters. On the 
other hand, the results might reflect the fact that, with time, the deputies elected from 
minority and opposition parties managed to challenge the government’s electoral plans 
thanks to their relatively high efficiency in obtaining benefits for their districts. This 
would be consistent with the idea that, since the 1890s, the local powers grew to the 
detriment of the central power (Moreno Luzón, 2007), and it might also explain to some 
extent the lack of significance of the seniority variables. Inasmuch as senior deputies 
remained in Parliament regardless of the party holding office, the effect of seniority 
would be partially captured by the share of minority and/or opposition parties in each 
province. 
***Table 3 about here*** 
An alternative way to account for the presence of structural change in the model 
is the interaction of the political competition variables with a linear time trend, as in the 
following specification: 
ittitititittit DXSeniorityLeadershipnCompetitioPoli εδλψμβ +++++= .
 
itiit u+= αε  
βt = β0 + β1 × trend  
 
 
(2) 
Hence, the new variables in the regression are: % Minority Seats × trend, % Opposition 
Seats × trend and % Change in Minority Seats × trend. Actually, if we ignore (as in the 
regressions in Tables 2 and 3) the possibility that the effect of the “political 
competition” variables may present a shifting trend over time, we might be dealing with 
the results of a spurious regression in which the impact of the explanatory variables on 
road investment would be in fact the effect of an omitted factor. In this context, 
introducing the interaction of a time trend with the explanatory variables allows us to 
capture the impact of the upward trend in the level of political competition over time (as 
revealed by Figure 2). The outcomes of the estimation of this specification of the model 
are shown in Table 4. 
***Table 4 about here*** 
All columns in Table 4 confirms the results obtained in the earlier analysis, 
where we introduced the possibility of a structural change, although now the 
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 interpretation of the coefficients is not so straightforward. Using the results reported in 
column (5) we can see that in an initial year (t=1) a 10% increase in the share of 
minority deputies in one province leads to a 0.017 pesetas decrease in per capita road 
investment. However, this effect does not remain constant for the entire period. By the 
end of the period (for instance when t=30, which is equivalent to 1909) the effect is 
quite distinct and we would observe a 0.012 pesetas increase in per capita road 
investment as a result of a 10% increase in the share of minority deputies in one 
province. The βt specification in equation (2) allows us to infer the cut-off year when 
the initially negative effect of the number of minority deputies was cancelled out and 
after which the effect became positive. Thus, it was at t=18 (that is, in 1897) when a 
province’s share of minority deputies had no impact on the government allocation of 
road expenditure. Following the same reasoning, the share of deputies representing the 
“dynastic” opposition exerted no impact on the distribution of road investment in 1899. 
Robustness. To conclude this section, we present in short the robustness checks 
that we have conducted to ensure the validity of our results.  First of all, it might be 
argued that, despite solid reasons for taking 1890 as the cut-off point for dividing the 
sample into two subperiods, the results might be different if another year had been 
selected. As mentioned in footnote 24, 1898 could also represent a reasonable cut-off 
point. We have performed the same regressions as those reported in Table 3 on the basis 
of this hypothesis and find that, besides obtaining slightly lower coefficients, the sign 
and significance of the variables remained unaltered in all cases except for the two 
variables related to the share of Opposition deputies, which lose their significance. 
Secondly, we have also tried to capture the level of seniority that the deputies of a 
province had by using another specification, which attempts to reflect the level of 
seniority of a deputy compared to the maximum seniority that he would have had if he 
had been elected in all previous elections. Then, the seniority level of province i can be 
expressed as follows: 
Max
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where τn,i,t is the number of times that deputy n in province i at election year t has been 
previously elected, τtMax is the maximum number of times that a deputy could have been 
elected (i.e. the number of previous elections) up to election year t and N is the number 
24
 of deputies in province i in electoral year t. The analysis with this indicator of seniority 
does not alter our previous results. Our third robustness check was to consider a cubic 
as opposed to a linear time trend. This allows the effect of the ‘political competition 
variables’ to be seen in three different stages, implying that the effect of this variable is 
not null at a precise point in time but rather that it remains null for a number of years 
before changing its sign, which would result in a smoother transition. However, the 
non-significant results of this regression tell us that this type of trend is unlikely to fit 
with the patterns observed during the period under analysis. Lastly, column (6) of each 
table provides the estimates of the fixed effect regressions of each specification,25 as a 
further means for checking the robustness of the results. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the effects of parliamentary representation on the 
distribution of state funding for road infrastructure during the Spanish Restoration. Put 
more simply, it has investigated the possibility that politicians affected individuals’ 
voting preferences (as well as their welfare) by directly allocating state spending to 
promote a particular district’s interests. One of the main points of interest arising out of 
this case study is the fact that it involves a political system in which the widespread use 
by politicians of vote-buying mechanisms coexisted with a process of increasing 
electoral competition. 
Our findings from a panel data set for Spanish provinces between 1880 and 
1914 confirm the relevance of political factors in the regional distribution of road 
building. During this period, the Spanish electoral system underwent major changes that 
led the government to redefine its political tactics. More specifically, the mid-1890s 
seem to have constituted a turning point, after which electoral strategies experienced 
significant change. Once this structural change is taken into consideration in the 
estimation, our analysis shows that the party in government, initially, undertook 
relatively less road investment in those provinces with a largest representation of 
minority and/or opposition deputies. This was presumably aimed at avoiding their 
                                                        
25 This requires a degree-of-freedom adjustment on the cluster-robust covariance estimator due to the fact 
that panels are not nested within clusters. 
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 empowerment and, thus, their potential challenge to the turno pacífico system. 
However, later on, increasing political competition resulted in the government re-
channelling road expenditure towards the provinces more represented by minority and 
opposition deputies. Moreover, our estimates show that the provinces with a higher 
proportion of senior deputies who had been ministers in previous administrations 
obtained more public resources for road construction. In this sense, the ability of 
influential deputies to attract resources to their constituencies might have been rewarded 
with more votes, regardless of the political persuasion of their party of affiliation.  
To conclude, these results indicate that political variables had a statistically 
significant impact on the allocation of road infrastructure during the Spanish 
Restoration. Further, our findings point to the importance of electoral dynamics within a 
political system that is often considered to be non-democratic, while the overall analysis 
offers an interesting example of the long-term evolution in government tactics within 
settings characterised by clientelist practices. 
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Figure 1. Liberal and Conservative deputies as share of total 
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Figure 2. Minority deputies as share of total 
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 Figure 3. Spanish road network mileage by category 
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Source: Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria(s), Anuario(s) and Estadística(s) de Obras Públicas (1865-1924). 
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  Table 1:  
  Descriptive statistics and data sources 
Variable Description Mean (S.D) Source 
Road investment 
p.c. 
Pesetas of road investmentit / Populationit 
1.16 
(1.07) 
Memorias, Anuarios and 
Estadísticas de Obras 
Públicas, Ministerio de 
Fomento (1880-1914) 
% Minority Seats Minority parties seatsit / Total seatsit 
0.07 
(0.14) 
% Opposition Seats 
Dynastic opposition parties seatsit / Total 
seatsit 
0.24 
(0.18) 
% Change in 
Minority Seats it
tiit
SeatsMinority
SeatsMinoritySeatsMinority
%
%% 1, −−  0.07 
(0.25) 
Relative Seniority 
∑
= ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
1
,,1
n
Max
t
tin
N τ
τ  
Max
tτ : max. number of times that a deputy has 
been elected up to election year t             
tin ,,τ  : nº of times that deputy n in province i at 
election year t has been previously elected.             
N: total number of deputies in province i in 
electoral year t 
0.37 
(0.15) 
% Senior Deputies 
Deputies elected in previous 
electionsit/Total nº of deputiesit 
0.61 
(0.20) 
Public Works 
Minister 
Dummy variable = 1 if the Minister of 
Public Works represents province i in 
election term t  
0.02 
(0.13) 
% Deputies who 
were Ministers in 
the past 
Deputies in province i who were ministers 
in previous electoral terms/Total nº of 
deputies in t  
0.07 
(0.25) 
 
Varela Ortega (2001), 
Sánchez de los Santos 
(1908 and 1910), El año 
político (1895-1910), El 
Imparcial (1876), El 
Liberal (1881-1910), La 
Correspondencia de 
España (1879-1905), La 
Época (1879-1905), ABC 
(1905) and Historical 
Archive of Deputies 
(Spanish Congress). 
 
 
Urban Population 
Population in cities of over 10,000 
inhab.it/Populationit 
0.23  
(0.20) 
Calculated from the 
Spanish population 
censuses 
Industrial Sector % Industrial Production it / Total GDPit 
0.18 
(0.08) 
GDP p.c 
GDP it (in thousands of pesetas) / 
Populationit 
0.47 
(0.17) 
 
Data provided by Julio 
Martínez-Galarraga 
 
Note: Subindex it always refers to province i and year t. 
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 Table 2: 
Determinants of the regional allocation of road investment during the Spanish Restoration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1)  
Random-
effects 
(2) 
Random-
effects 
(3) 
Random-
effects 
(4) 
Random-
effects 
(5) 
Random-
effects 
(6) 
Fixed-
effects 
‘Political Competition’ factors 
% Opposition Seats 0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
--.-- --.-- -0.03 
(-0.15) 
-0.03 
(-0.19) 
       
% Minority Seats 0.72** 
(2.11) 
0.86** 
(2.24) 
--.-- --.-- 0.60* 
(1.67) 
0.44 
(1.32) 
       
% Change in Minority Seats --.-- -0.08 
(-1.42) 
--.-- --.-- -0.03 
(-0.55) 
-0.02 
(-0.33) 
‘Leadership and Seniority’ factors 
Public Works Minister --.-- --.-- 0.55 
(0.95) 
0.55 
(0.95) 
0.59 
(1.05) 
0.59 
(1.14) 
       
% Deputies who were 
Ministers in the past 
--.-- --.-- 1.05** 
(2.17) 
0.88** 
(2.04) 
1.01** 
(2.04) 
1.09** 
(2.18) 
       
Relative Seniority --.-- --.-- -0.27 
(0.63) 
--.-- -0.07 
(0.16) 
-0.10 
(0.24) 
       
% Senior Deputies --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.05 
(0.24) 
--.-- --.-- 
Control Variables 
GDP p.c. --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 1.95*** 
(3.41) 
2.90*** 
(4.27) 
       
Urban Population --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- -1.27** 
(-2.14) 
1.09 
(0.97) 
       
Industrial Sector --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- -2.57** 
(-2.42) 
-2.63** 
(-1.97) 
       
Constant 0.99*** 
(5.25) 
0.98*** 
(5.13) 
0.92*** 
(4.39) 
0.98*** 
(4.67) 
0.81*** 
(2.56) 
-0.07 
(-0.15) 
Nº Observations 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 
Time-effects ( fT) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.0883 0.0896 0.0681 0.0716 0.112 0.139 
Robust Hausman Test       
(fe vs.re) 
0.17 
[0.84] 
0.11 
[0.95] 
0.69 
[0.56] 
2.00  
[0.11] 
1.07 
[0.38] --.-- 
B-P LM Test(Var(u)=0) 3669.55 
[0.00] 
3682.96 
[0.00] 
3666.93 
[0.00] 
3562.21 
[0.00] 
2543.49 
[0.00] --.-- 
F-Test (H0: fT =0) 181.07 
[0.00] 
181.22 
[0.00] 
179.22 
[0.00] 
171.17 
[0.00] 
175.17 
[0.00] 
5.91 
[0.00] 
F-Test (H0:Fixed-eff.=0) --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 19.07 [0.00] 
Notes: (1) Robust z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (2) p-values in brackets; (3) SE 
clustered by province and election (45 provinces x 14 elections=630 clusters); (4) DoF adjustment is imposed in the 
fixed-effect regression; (5) Refer to Table 1 for a brief explanation of the variables. 
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 Table 3: 
Determinants of the regional allocation of road investment during the Spanish Restoration. 
Interaction of a dummy for the 2nd subperiod (1892-1914) with ‘political competition’ factors 
 (1) 
Random-
effects 
(2) 
Random-
effects 
(3) 
Random-
effects 
(4) 
Random-
effects 
(5) 
Random-
effects 
(6) 
Fixed-
effects 
‘Political Competition’ factors 
% Opposition Seats -0.76* 
(-1.79) 
-0.76* 
(-1.80) 
--.-- --.-- -0.84** 
(-1.94) 
-0.91** 
(-2.20) 
       
% Opposition Seats × 2nd 
Subperiod  
1.01** 
(2.20) 
1.01** 
(2.21) 
--.-- --.-- 1.07** 
(2.34) 
1.16*** 
(2.62) 
       
% Minority Seats -1.25* 
(-1.82) 
-1.16 
(-1.54) 
--.-- --.-- -1.23* 
(-1.65) 
-1.24* 
(-1.81) 
       
% Minority Seats × 2nd 
Subperiod  
2.35*** 
(3.05) 
2.43*** 
(2.86) 
--.-- --.-- 2.24*** 
(2.79) 
2.09*** 
(2.79) 
       
% Change in Minority Seats --.-- -0.03 
(-0.23) 
--.-- --.-- 0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.00 
(-0.00) 
       
% Change in Minority 
Seats× 2nd Subperiod  
--.-- -0.06 
(-0.40) 
--.-- --.-- -0.06 
(-0.40) 
-0.02 
(-0.17) 
‘Leadership and Seniority’ factors 
Public Works Minister --.-- --.-- 0.55 
(0.95) 
0.55 
(0.95) 
0.57 
(1.08) 
0.57 
(1.19) 
       
% Deputies who were 
Ministers in the past 
--.-- --.-- 1.05** 
(2.17) 
0.88** 
(2.04) 
1.07** 
(2.19) 
1.16** 
(2.36) 
       
Relative Seniority --.-- --.-- -0.27 
(0.63) 
--.-- -0.08 
(0.18) 
-0.11 
(0.25) 
       
% Senior Deputies --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.05 
(0.24) 
--.-- --.-- 
Control Variables 
GDP p.c. --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 1.70*** 
(3.02) 
2.52*** 
(3.83) 
       
Urban Population --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- -1.16** 
(-1.98) 
1.29 
(1.15) 
       
Industrial Sector --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- -2.75*** 
(-2.62) 
-3.00** 
(-2.30) 
       
Constant 1.19*** 
(5.80) 
1.18*** 
(5.73) 
0.92*** 
(4.39) 
0.98*** 
(4.67) 
1.14*** 
(3.47) 
0.33 
(0.78) 
Nº Observations 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 
Time-effects ( fT) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.0913 0.0936 0.0681 0.0716 0.120 0.154 
Robust Hausman Test        
(fe vs.re) 
0.29  
[0.88] 
0.22  
[0.97] 
0.69 
[0.56] 
2.00  
[0.11] 
1.07  
[0.39] --.-- 
B-P LM Test(Var(u)=0) 3795.82 
[0.00] 
3745.56 
[0.00] 
3666.93 
[0.00] 
3562.21 
[0.00] 
2607.51 
[0.00] --.-- 
F-Test (H0: fT =0) 179.98 
[0.00] 
176.99  
[0.00] 
179.22 
[0.00] 
171.17 
[0.00] 
177.45 
 [0.00] 
6.55 
[0.00] 
F-Test (H0:Fixed-eff.=0) --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 19.54 [0.00] 
Notes: (1) Robust z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (2) p-values in brackets; (3) SE 
clustered by province and election (45 provinces x 14 elections=630 clusters); (4) DoF adjustment is imposed in the 
fixed-effect regression; (5) Refer to Table 1 for a brief explanation of the variables. 
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 Table 4: 
Determinants of the regional allocation of road investment during the Spanish Restoration. 
Interaction of linear trend with the ‘political competition’ factors. 
 
 (1) 
Random-
effects 
(2) 
Random-
effects 
(3) 
Random-
effects 
(4) 
Random-
effects 
(5) 
Random-
effects 
(6) 
Fixed-
effects 
‘Political Competition’ factors 
% Opposition Seats -0.73 
(-1.55) 
-0.74 
(-1.55) 
--.-- --.-- -0.79* 
(-1.67) 
-0.85* 
(-1.85) 
       
% Opposition Seats×Trend 0.04* 
(1.65) 
0.04* 
(1.68) 
--.-- --.-- 0.04* 
(1.78) 
0.04** 
(1.97) 
       
% Minority Seats -1.84*** 
(-2.58) 
-1.84** 
(-2.30) 
--.-- --.-- -1.80** 
(-2.29) 
-1.84** 
(-2.38) 
       
% Minority Seats×Trend 0.10*** 
(3.40) 
0.11*** 
(3.25) 
--.-- --.-- 0.10*** 
(3.15) 
0.09*** 
(3.16) 
       
% Change in Minority Seats --.-- 0.07 
(0.45) 
--.-- --.-- 0.07 
(0.46) 
0.06 
(0.41) 
       
% Change in Minority 
Seats× Trend 
--.-- -0.01 
(-0.75) 
--.-- --.-- -0.00 
(-0.48) 
-0.00 
(-0.36) 
‘Leadership and Seniority’ factors 
Public Works Minister --.-- --.-- 0.55 
(0.95) 
0.55 
(0.95) 
0.55 
(1.02) 
0.55 
(1.10) 
       
% Deputies who were 
Ministers in the past 
--.-- --.-- 1.05** 
(2.17) 
0.88** 
(2.04) 
1.07** 
(2.18) 
1.15** 
(2.34) 
       
Relative Seniority --.-- --.-- -0.27 
(0.63) 
--.-- -0.05 
(0.12) 
-0.08 
(0.19) 
       
% Senior Deputies --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.05 
(0.24) 
--.-- --.-- 
Control Variables 
GDP p.c. --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 1.61*** 
(2.93) 
2.31*** 
(3.53) 
       
Urban Population --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- -1.11* 
(-1.88) 
1.25 
(1.11) 
       
Industrial Sector --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- -2.68** 
(-2.53) 
-3.02** 
(-2.31) 
       
Constant 1.20*** 
(5.92) 
1.21*** 
(5.79) 
0.92*** 
(4.39) 
0.98*** 
(4.67) 
1.16*** 
(3.63) 
0.44 
(1.06) 
Nº Observations 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 
Time-effects ( fT) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.0880 0.0901 0.0681 0.0716 0.118 0.154 
Robust Hausman Test  (fe 
vs.re) 
0.34  
[0.85] 
0.23  
[0.97] 
0.69 
[0.56] 
2.00  
[0.11] 
0.83  
[0.62] --.-- 
B-P LM Test(Var(u)=0) 3830.76 
[0.00] 
3808.31 
[0.00] 
3666.93 
[0.00] 
3562.21 
[0.00] 
2666.01 
[0.00] --.-- 
F-Test (H0: fT =0) 183.41 
[0.00] 
181.42  
[0.00] 
179.22 
[0.00] 
171.17 
[0.00] 
174.39  
[0.00] 
5.00 
[0.00] 
F-Test (H0:Fixed-eff.=0) --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 19.45 [0.00] 
Notes: (1) Robust z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (2) p-values in brackets; (3) SE 
clustered by province and election (45 provinces x 14 elections=630 clusters); (4) DoF adjustment is imposed in the 
fixed-effect regression; (5) Refer to Table 1 for a brief explanation of the variables. 
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